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We introduce, for any bipartite Bell scenario, a measure that quantifies both the amount of non-
locality and the efficiency in device-independent quantum key distribution of a set of measurement
outcomes probabilities. It is a proper measure of nonlocality as it vanishes when this set is Bell
local and does not increase under the allowed transformations of the nonlocality resource theory.
This device-independent key rate R is defined assuming each legitimate party does not use just one
preselected measurement to generate its raw key but randomly chooses at each round one among
all the measurements at its disposal. A common and secret key can certainly be established when
R is positive but not when it is zero. Any continuous proper measure of nonlocality N sets a tight
lower bound on R that is nondecreasing with N and vanishes when N does. There can thus be
a threshold value for the amount of nonlocality, as quantified by N , above which a secret key is
surely achievable. We find a readily computable measure with such a threshold for two two-outcome
measurements per legitimate party.
I. INTRODUCTION
Using a secret sequence of characters, termed a key, for
encryption and decryption, allows to transmit a message
in an absolutely confidential way. The aim of quantum
key distribution (QKD) studies is to examine whether
two distant legitimate users, usually named Alice and
Bob, can establish such a key in the presence of an eaves-
dropper, Eve, within the framework of quantum mechan-
ics [1]. To do so, Alice and Bob need at least to be able
to process and exchange classical information and each
to choose one out of several measurements to perform
on quantum systems. The communication channel be-
tween them is public. Namely, any message sent over
it becomes known to all parties. Moreover, Alice’s and
Bob’s quantum systems in general share a global state
with systems that Eve can manipulate as she wishes. On
the other hand, Eve does not know which measurements
Alice and Bob actually perform, the outcomes they get
and the results of their classical computations. The first
security analyses of QKD schemes apply only to specific
quantum systems Hilbert spaces and measurement op-
erators on these spaces [1–7]. Consequently, a concrete
implementation must follow the ideal model exactly.
Device-independent QKD (DIQKD) protocols, on the
contrary, do not require that Alice and Bob know any-
thing about the sizes and states of the quantum systems
and about the measurement devices [8, 9]. They can only
estimate the probabilities of the measurement outcomes.
To establish a common and secret key, they first gener-
ate raw keys using measurent outcomes. These keys are
not fully confidential and not completely identical to each
other. Alice and Bob change them into the final key with
the help of the above mentioned classical means. In Refs.
[8, 9], only the so-called collective attacks, during the
generation of the raw keys, are considered. Namely, it is
assumed that Eve prepares a tripartite quantum system
in the same state several times and that Alice’s and Bob’s
possible measurements are the same each time. But the
measurements may actually be performed on a global
system which is not necessarily in a product state and
the measurement devices may work differently from one
round to another [10, 11]. Furthermore, these appara-
tuses may have internal memories [12, 13]. The security
of a DIQKD protocol against these most general attacks
follows from that against collective attacks [13].
Device-dependent QKD is closely related to quantum
entanglement. Some proposed protocols rely on entan-
gled Alice’s and Bob’s quantum systems [3, 5]. More-
over, the security of those known as prepare-and-measure
protocols, for which such quantum correlations are ab-
sent, results from that of corresponding entanglement-
based protocols [4, 6, 7]. Entanglement is a useful re-
source for many tasks and different measures of the en-
tanglement of quantum states, appropriate for different
tasks, have been introduced [14]. In more specific terms,
entanglement theory is a resource theory. Entangle-
ment cannot increase under local operations and classi-
cal communication and vanishes for separable states [14–
19]. Consequently, a proper measure of entanglement,
called an entanglement monotone, is nonincreasing un-
der these allowed transformations and is zero for separa-
ble states. The distillable key rate, defined for a given
legitimate QKD users’ state, satisfies these requirements
and can be related to more familiar entanglement mono-
tones [14, 20, 21]. In DIQKD, since Alice and Bob can
only estimate joint probability distributions, the relevant
resource is not entanglement but more likely Bell nonlo-
cality [3, 8, 9, 22, 23] whose relation to entanglement is
not straightforward [15, 24–26].
Bell nonlocality can also be formulated in terms of a re-
source theory [27]. Proper measures of nonlocality must
not increase under the corresponding allowed transforma-
tions and vanish for Bell local sets of probabilities. We
name these measures as nonlocality monotones. In this
paper, we are interested in Bell nonlocality as a resource
for DIQKD from this rigorous perspective. We introduce,
for any numbers of choosable measurements and mea-
surement outcomes, a nonlocality monotone R which is
a DIQKD efficiency quantifier. This device-independent
key rate is defined, under the assumption of collective at-
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2tacks, by considering a class of protocols, to generate the
raw keys, which involve processing and publicly exchang-
ing classical information and randomly choosing at each
round, for each legitimate user, one among all the pos-
sible measurements. The usual protocols that consist in
using only two preselected measurements belong to this
class. A confidential key can surely be established when
R is positive but not when it is zero. Since the rate R
is a nonlocality monotone, it does not decrease in going
from a set of measurement outcomes probabilities to a
more nonlocal one. We show that any continuous nonlo-
cality monotone N sets a tight lower bound on R that is
nondecreasing with N and vanishes when N does. Thus,
either this bound is trivial and nothing can be inferred
from N alone about the achievability of a secret key, or
there is a threshold value for the amount of nonlocality,
as quantified by N , above which Alice and Bob are cer-
tain that such a key can be established, without needing
to evaluate any other quantity.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec.II, we
specify, in terms of classical random variables, the oper-
ations that the legitimate users can perform. In Sec.III,
we introduce the considered class of raw key protocols,
which involve only these operations, and give the expres-
sion of the quantum state shared by the three parties
at the end of such a protocol. In Sec.IV, we define the
device-independent key rate R corresponding to this class
of protocols and show that it is a nonlocality monotone.
In Sec.V, we consider the continuous nonlocality mono-
tones, derive the above mentioned result, which follows
from the fact that R is a nonlocality monotone, and dis-
cuss a particular case. Finally, in Sec.VI, we summarize
our results and mention some open questions.
II. ALICE AND BOB’S POSSIBLE
OPERATIONS
The following situation is considered throughout the
paper. Alice, Bob and Eve initially share a quantum
system in the state ρ. Alice (Bob) can choose one of
m (n) measurements to perform on her (his) subsystem
with Hilbert space HA (HB) which can always be as-
sumed to be infinite-dimensional. The legitimate users
know nothing about the quantum system, its state and
the measurement devices. In more precise terms, Alice
(Bob) can observe one of m (n) classical random vari-
ables Ax (By). Alice and Bob can only get information
on the probability mass functions PAx,By , denoted Px,y
in the following. The indices x and y are usually termed
as inputs and the outcomes of the random variables Ax
and By as outputs. Without loss of generality, it can
be assumed that all variables Ax (By) have the same set
A (B) of outputs by adding zero probability outcomes.
These sets are referred to as alphabets. Obviously, m,
n, A and B are known to Alice and Bob. The random
variable Ax (By) corresponds to a set of positive oper-
ators Mx,a (Ny,b) such that
∑
a∈AMx,a (
∑
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FIG. 1: Raw key protocol steps used in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. The values k, x′ and y′ are produced by random
generators. Eve eavesdrops k sent by Alice over the public
channel. Classical computations, shown as ellipses, result in
x = z(x′, k), y = t(y′, k), u′ = Fx′,k(u) and v
′ = Gy′,k(v) with
the functions given by the Lemma. The measurements per-
formed by Alice and Bob on their quantum systems, shown
as boxes, give the outputs u and v as functions of the inputs
x and y, respectively, according to the distributions (1).
the identity operator on HA (HB) and
Px,y(a, b) = tr(ρMx,a ⊗Ny,b ⊗ IE), (1)
where IE is the identity operator on Eve’s Hilbert space
HE . A distribution tuple P = (Px,y(a, b))x,y,a,b is said
to be quantum if it can be written in this form with
appropriate state and measurement operators.
In addition to the Ax and By, Alice and Bob can cre-
ate random variables uncorrelated to the Ax and By and
available at first only to one of them. Each can also com-
pute new random variables from preexisting ones and use
a classical public communication channel. Any message
sent over this channel becomes known to the three par-
ties and it is the only way to get a random variable from
another party. It is not necessary to introduce explic-
itly additional variables for Eve since they can be taken
into account by considering suitable system, state ρ and
measurements on her subsystem. Let us be more specific
about how the Ax, that cannot be observed simultane-
ously, are employed. At some stage, Alice uses one of the
random variables at her disposal, say X, with alphabet
in {1, . . . ,m}, to choose which Ax to observe. More pre-
cisely, she generates U according to U = Ax when X = x.
Bob uses the By and Y with alphabet in {1, . . . , n} in a
similar way to produce the random variable V , see Fig.1.
III. RAW KEY PROTOCOLS
To generate their raw keys, using the Ax and By, Al-
ice and Bob proceed as follows. First, they create some
random variables and send some of them over the public
channel. Then, they calculate new ones and subsequently
3produce the U and V as explained above. Finally, they
generate A and B from all the available random vari-
ables. Alice’s (Bob’s) raw key is a sequence of indepen-
dent realizations of A (B). All the just mentioned clas-
sical random variables but U , V , A and B are quantum-
mechanically described by the state
ρ˜ =
∑
x,y,e
PX,Y ,E(x,y, e)Π
Alice
x,e ⊗ΠBoby,e ⊗ΠEvee , (2)
where E is a tuple made up of the public ones and X (Y )
is made up of Alice’s (Bob’s) private ones. The choice
random variable X (Y ) is a component of X (Y ) or of
E. From their definitions, X and Y are conditionally
independent given E, i.e., PX,Y ,E = PX|EPY |EPE . The
ΠAlicex,e (Π
Bob
y,e , Π
Eve
e ) are rank-one projectors whose sum
is the identity operator on a Hilbert space H′A (H′B , H′E).
At the end of the raw key protocol, the three parties share
the state
ρrk =
∑
a,b
Πa ⊗Πb ⊗ trHAB (ρ′Ma ⊗Nb ⊗ I ′E), (3)
where ρ′ = ρ˜⊗ρ, I ′E is the identity operator on H′E⊗HE ,
Πa (Πb) denotes mutually orthogonal rank-one projectors
and trHAB the partial trace over the Hilbert spaceHAB =
H′A⊗HA⊗H′B⊗HB , see Appendix A. Observing A and B
means performing the measurement with operators Πa⊗
Πb ⊗ I ′E on ρrk. The positive operator Ma reads
Ma =
∑
x,e,u
PA|U,X,E(a|u,x, e)ΠAlicex,e ⊗Mx,u, (4)
where x corresponds to X and the conditional probability
mass function PA|U,X,E is determined by the protocol.
The operators Nb are given by similar expressions.
Equation (3) shows that the correlations between Al-
ice, Bob and Eve at the end of the raw key protocol are
formally identical to those obtained by performing the
measurement with operators Ma ⊗ Nb ⊗ I ′E on ρ′. The
simple protocol in which Alice and Bob each choose a
particular input, say ξ and ζ, is obviously one of those
considered here. In this case, there is no public ran-
dom variables, PX(x) = δx,ξ, PY (y) = δy,ζ , A = U
and B = V and so the last term of eq.(3) simplifies to
trHA⊗HB (ρMξ,a⊗Nζ,b⊗IE). Strictly speaking, the above
is only valid when Eve merely collects the public informa-
tion in the course of the raw key protocol. However, any
Eve’s measurement during it can equivalently be taken
into account as a measurement on ρrk, see Appendix A.
Thus, it can be considered as being performed amid the
protocol generating the private key.
IV. DEVICE-INDEPENDENT KEY RATE
Let ω be a state of the form of eq.(3), l(ω) the length
of the longest secret key that Alice and Bob can achieve
when they share ω⊗L with Eve and R′(ω) the large L
limit of l(ω)/L [21, 28]. We define, for any quantum
distribution tuple P , the device-independent key rate
R(P ) = inf
ρ,(Mx,a)a,(Ny,b)b
sup
rkp
R′(ρrk), (5)
where the supremum is taken over all the raw key proto-
cols described above, the infimum is taken over all the ρ,
(Mx,a)a and (Ny,b)b satisfying eq.(1) with P and ρrk is
given by eqs.(2)-(4) with the probability mass functions
of the protocol rkp. The rate R is nonnegative by con-
struction. Whenever Alice’s and Bob’s random variables
are described by the distributions Px,y, they can estab-
lish, in the limit of large L, a secret key of length at least
equal to LR(P ) from raw keys of L characters generated
using an appropriate raw key protocol. In particular, a
privy key can surely be generated as soon as R(P ) > 0.
If R(P ) = 0, there are states and measurement opera-
tors fulfilling eq.(1) with P for which a confidential key
cannot be achieved.
As we will see, R preserves the Bell nonlocality order
defined as follows. Consider two distribution tuples P
and P ′ consisting of no-signaling probabilities with the
same output alphabets and numbers of inputs. The for-
mer is not less nonlocal than the latter if the probabilities
P ′x,y(a, b) can be obtained from the Px,y(a, b) by perform-
ing operations which are compositions of input and out-
put relabelings, output coarse grainings and input substi-
tutions and by mixing the results of such operations and
with any Bell local distribution tuple [27]. For quantum
P and P ′ related in this way, one has R(P ′) ≤ R(P ).
This monotonicity of R can be proved using the Lemma
below. We remark that the nonlocality order is partial,
i.e., for some pairs of distribution tuples, none of the two
can be transformed into the other by the operations just
mentioned.
Lemma. Let P and P ′ be two distribution tuples with
output alphabets A and B and numbers m and n of in-
puts such that P is not less nonlocal than P ′ and Ax
and By be random variables such that PAx,By = Px,y.
There are a random integer K and tuples A˜ = (A˜x)
m
x=1
and B˜ = (B˜y)
n
y=1 with a joint probability mass function
of the form PKPA˜,B˜, where A˜x and B˜y have alphabets A
and B, respectively, self-maps Fx,k and Gy,k and inputs
z(x, k) and t(y, k) such that the distributions of
(A′x, B
′
y) = (A˜x, B˜y) if K = 0
=
(
Fx,k(Az(x,k)), Gy,k(Bt(y,k))
)
if K = k ≥ 1, (6)
are given by PA′x,B′y = P
′
x,y.
If P is quantum then also is P ′.
The proof of the Lemma is given in Appendix B. This
Lemma ensures that, from given Ax and By with dis-
tributions Px,y, Alice and Bob have effectively access to
random variables characterized by any distribution tuple
P ′ not more nonlocal than P , by proceeding as follows.
Alice creates the corresponding K, A˜x and B˜y and sends
4K and the B˜y to Bob. Then, she generates, in sequence,
the random variables X ′, X which is X ′ if K = 0 and
z(X ′, k) if K = k ≥ 1, U according to U = Ax when
X = x and, finally, U ′ which is A˜x′ if (K,X ′) = (0, x′)
and Fx′,k(U) if (K,X
′) = (k, x′) with k ≥ 1. Bob does
similar operations using K, the By and the B˜y, see Fig.1.
In this Figure, it is assumed, to simplify, thatK ≥ 1. The
above produces the same U ′ and V ′ as U ′ = A′x′ when
X ′ = x′ and V ′ = B′y′ when Y
′ = y′ where A′x′ and B
′
y′
are given by eq.(6). Note that Eve gets K and the B˜y
which are sent over the public channel.
Using the above Lemma, the following can be shown,
see Appendix C.
Proposition 1. The function R given by eq.(5) has the
properties:
(i) R preserves the nonlocality order.
(ii) R vanishes for Bell local distribution tuples.
A function fulfilling these two requirements is a non-
locality monotone, i.e., a proper measure of Bell non-
locality [27]. The above Proposition implies that the
device-independent key rate (5) is a nonlocality mono-
tone. Property (ii) can be seen as a consequence of the
fact that a secret key cannot always be established and
of (i) as follows. Any distribution tuple is not less non-
local than any Bell local one. Thus, due to property
(i), R assumes its minimum value for Bell local distribu-
tion tuples. If this minimum were nonzero then a secret
key could be produced in any case. Proposition 1 shows
that a private key can surely be generated for any dis-
tribution tuple not less nonlocal than a given one for
which this is possible. Besides, a confidential key can be
established with certainty only for nonlocal distribution
tuples. Proposition 1 does not ensure that the converse
holds. There may be nonlocal distribution tuples P such
that a privy key cannot be achieved for some states and
measurement operators fulfilling eq.(1) with P .
V. CONTINUOUS NONLOCALITY
MONOTONES
According to the above Proposition and definition (5),
the device-independent key rate R quantifies both the
efficiency in secret key generation and the amount of Bell
nonlocality of a distribution tuple. However, it is not
straightforward to evaluate. Moreover, one may prefer
a measure that vanishes only for Bell local distribution
tuples. It is then of interest to consider other nonlocality
monotones. For that purpose, we use the following result,
shown in Appendix D.
Proposition 2. Let Q and L be the sets of quantum and
Bell local distribution tuples, respectively.
For any nonlocality monotone M on Q and nonneg-
ative continuous function N on Q which vanishes on L,
there is a nondecreasing function f on I = [0, Nm], where
Nm is the maximum value of N on Q, such that f(0) = 0,
f ◦N ≤M and, for any s ∈ I and  > 0, there is P ∈ Q
for which N(P ) = s and M(P ) < f(s) + .
Whenever Alice’s and Bob’s random variables are de-
scribed by the distributions Px,y, they can generate a
secret key with a rate not lower than f ◦N(P ) where N
is any continuous nonlocality monotone and f is given
by the above Proposition with N and M = R. This re-
mains valid if f is replaced by other nondecreasing func-
tions but f is the greatest one. If f ◦ N(P ) = 0, there
exists, for any  > 0, a quantum distribution tuple P ′
such that N(P ′) = N(P ) and R(P ′) < . So, in this
case, nothing can be inferred from the value N(P ) re-
garding the possibility of establishing a confidential key.
On the contrary, f ◦ N(P ) > 0 ensures that a private
key can be generated. This condition can be rewritten
as N(P ) > N∗ where N∗ = sup{s ∈ I : f(s) = 0} is set
only by the measure N . By definition, N∗ is not larger
than the maximum value Nm. If N
∗ = Nm, f ◦ N = 0
and it cannot be determined whether a secret key can
be established by evaluating only N . By contrast, for a
measure N such that N∗ < Nm, N∗ is a threshold value
above which a privy key can be achieved with certainty.
Proposition 2 does not require that N is a nonlocality
monotone but only that it is continuous and vanishes for
Bell local tuples. For instance, N can be defined from a
Bell inequality. Proposition 2 applies to such measures
though they are not nonlocality monotones in general
[27].
We now consider the particular case of numbers of in-
puts m = n = 2 and alphabets A and B consisting of
two outputs, that can always be assumed to be −1 and
1, for which the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality
[29] violation
N˜(P ) = max
{
0,max
ν
∣∣ 2∑
x,y=1
ν(x, y)〈AxBy〉
∣∣− 2}, (7)
is a nonlocality monotone, as shown below. In this
expression, the maximum is taken over all the maps
ν : {1, 2}2 → {−1, 1} assuming the value −1 only once
and 〈C〉 denotes the expectation of the random variable
C. The measure (7) vanishes for Bell local distribution
tuples and only for them [25]. To see that it preserves
the nonlocality order, first note that it is a convex func-
tion of its argument. Moreover, the right side of eq.(7)
is not modified by an input relabeling. An output re-
labeling is equivalent to changing the sign of one of the
random variables in eq.(7), and so also does not alter the
value of N˜ . An input substitution is the same as setting
A1 = A2 or B1 = B2 in eq.(7) which gives N˜ = 0. An
output coarse graining is equivalent to replacing one of
the random variables in eq.(7) by 1 which also leads to
N˜ = 0. As is well known, the set of the possible values
of N˜ is the interval [0, 2(
√
2 − 1)] [30]. A nondecreasing
function g such that R ≥ g ◦ N˜ can be found, see Ap-
pendix E. It results from its expression that there is a
5threshold value N˜∗ ≤ 0.652 < 2(√2 − 1) for the nonlo-
cality monotone (7) above which a private key can surely
be generated. The existence of N˜∗ can be seen as fol-
lows. For any P such that N˜(P ) > 0, there are inputs
ξ and ζ for which 〈AξBζ〉 is finite. Consider a raw key
protocol generating A = ZAξ and B = ZBζ where Z is a
public equally distributed random variable with alphabet
{−1, 1}. The resulting rate R′(ρrk) in eq.(5), and hence
R(P ), is not lower than I(〈AB〉)− r ◦ N˜ where I is the
mutual information between A and B that depends only
on 〈AB〉 = 〈AξBζ〉 and r is a continuous nonincreasing
function with r(2
√
2 − 2) = 0 [9]. The function g can
be obtained by noting that there are ξ and ζ such that
|〈AB〉| ≥ 1/2 + N˜(P )/4. Other raw key protocols are
used in Appendix E.
VI. SUMMARY AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In summary, a device-independent key rate has been
introduced and shown to be a nonlocality monotone.
Moreover, it has been proved that there are only two pos-
sibilities for any continuous nonlocality monotone. Ei-
ther it can never be decided whether a secret key can be
established by evaluating only this measure, or there is a
threshold value for it above which this is surely achiev-
able. A readily computable nonlocality monotone with
such a threshold has been found for two two-outcome
measurements per legitimate user. The defined device-
independent key rate may vanish for some nonlocal sets
of probabilities. Were this not to be the case, Bell non-
locality would be a necessary and sufficient condition for
DIQKD with raw key protocols. This may be correct only
for some numbers of choosable measurements and mea-
surement outcomes. Related to this issue, it would be
interesting to improve the upper bound on the threshold
value of the aforementioned particular nonlocality mono-
tone. Since this measure vanishes only for Bell local sets
of probabilities, a threshold value of zero would prove the
above mentioned equivalence in this case. The answers
to these open questions may depend on the considered
class of raw key protocols. It can be further enlarged, for
instance, by dropping the assumption made here that no
information is exchanged after the measurements.
Appendix A: Derivation of equation 3
To simplify, the random variables transmitted over the
public channel at the same stage of the raw key proto-
col are here grouped into one. After receiving the value
e1 of the first one E1, Eve performs a measurement on
her subsystem. This generates a random variable E′1 and
ρ is changed into Λe1,e′1(ρ)/pe1,e′1 when E
′
1 = e
′
1 where
pe1,e′1 = tr Λe1,e′1(ρ). The Kraus operators of the quan-
tum operation Λe1,e′1 are of the form IA ⊗ IB ⊗Ke1,e′1,i
where IA (IB) is the identity operator on HA (HB). The
probabilities pe1,e′1 satisfy
∑
e′1
pe1,e′1 = 1. A determinis-
tic operation, e.g, the identity operation, is a measure-
ment with a single outcome e′1. Moreover, sequential
measurements can be considered as a single one with a
properly defined E′1. The set of the values e
′
1 may de-
pend on e1. However, it can be assumed, without loss
of generality, that it does not, by adding zero probabil-
ity outcomes, and hence that there is a unique E′1 with
PE′1|E1(e
′
1|e1) = pe1,e′1 . Repeating these arguments for all
components of E leads to the random tuple E′, condi-
tional distribution PE′|E and quantum operations Λe,e′
with Kraus operators IA ⊗ IB ⊗Ke,e′,i.
The probability mass function of X, Y , E, E′, U and
V is PX,Y ,EPE′|EPU,V |X,Y ,E,E′ where the last condi-
tional distribution is given by
P (u, v|x,y, e, e′) = tr(Λe,e′(ρ)Mx,u⊗Ny,v⊗I ′′E)/P (e′|e),
with the appropriate identity operator I ′′E , and omitting
the subscripts for the distributions. For given values of
these random variables, Eve’s state is proportionnal to
Λ′e,e′(trHA⊗HB (ρMx,u ⊗ Ny,v ⊗ IE)) where Λ′e,e′ is the
quantum operation with Kraus operators Ke,e′,i. The
marginal distribution PA,B,E,E′ directly follows with the
conditional distributions PA|U,X,E and PB|V,Y ,E of the
protocol. Using PX,Y ,U,V |A,B,E,E′ , one finds that Eve’s
state for A = a, B = b, E = e and E′ = e′ is
ωa,b,e,e′ = Λe′
(
ΠEvee ⊗
∑
x,y,u,v
P (a|u,x, e)P (b|v,y, e)
×P (x,y, e) trHA⊗HB (ρMx,u⊗Ny,v⊗IE)
)
/P (a, b, e, e′),
where ΠEvee = |e〉〈e| and Λe′ is the quantum operation
with Kraus operators 〈e| ⊗Ke,e′,i. Performing the mea-
surement with operators Πa ⊗Πb ⊗ΠEvee ⊗ IE and then
that characterized by the Λe′ on the state given by eq.(3)
leads to the same distribution PA,B,E,E′ and Eve’s states
ωa,b,e,e′ .
Appendix B: Proof of the Lemma
The tuples P and P ′ are related by
P ′ = p0L+
∑
k≥1
pkTk(P ), (B1)
where the probabilities pk obey
∑
k≥0 pk = 1, L is a Bell
local distribution tuple, and Tk are compositions of in-
put and output relabelings, output coarse grainings and
input substitutions [27]. The tuple L can be written
as L =
∑
a,b qa,bDa,b where the sum runs over all the
a = (ax)x ∈ An and b = (by)y ∈ Bm, the probabilities
qa,b sum to unity and the only nonvanishing components
of Da,b, for the inputs x and y, are those corresponding
to the outputs a = ax and b = by [25]. Consider ran-
dom tuples A˜ = (A˜x)
m
x=1 and B˜ = (B˜y)
n
y=1 where A˜x
6and B˜y have alphabets A and B, respectively, such that
PA˜,B˜(a, b) = qa,b. The components of L are equal to
the marginal probabilities PA˜x,B˜y (a, b).
Let Pˆ be any distribution tuple. An input substitu-
tion acts on it as follows. The components Pˆx′,y(a, b) are
replaced by the Pˆx,y(a, b) for some given x and x
′ and the
other ones remain unchanged. We denote this operation
as I(x,x′) and similarly for given inputs y and y′. An in-
put relabeling consists in a permutation of the inputs x or
of the inputs y. Since any permutation can be expressed
as a product of transpositions, an input relabeling can
be decomposed into operations that exchange the prob-
abilities Pˆx,y(a, b) and Pˆx′,y(a, b) for some given x and
x′ and leave the other ones unchanged, which we denote
by I{x,x′}, and similarly for given inputs y and y′. The
input operations satisfy I{y,y′}◦I{x,x′} = I{x,x′}◦I{y,y′}
and similar commutation relations with one or both op-
erations replaced by an input substitution.
The output operations can be decomposed into trans-
formations that change only the probabilities Pˆx,y(a, b)
for a given x or y. We denote such operations as Ox and
Oy. They obey Oy ◦Ox = Ox◦Oy. We have also I(x,x′)◦
Oz = Oz ◦ I(x,x′) for z 6= x, x′, I(x,x′) ◦ Ox′ = I(x,x′),
I(x,x′)◦Ox = Ox◦Ox′ ◦I(x,x′), I{x,x′}◦Oz = Oz ◦I{x,x′}
for z 6= x, x′, I{x,x′} ◦ Ox = Ox′ ◦ I{x,x′} and similar re-
lations with the inputs x and x′ replaced by inputs y
and y′. Consequently, any transformation Tk appearing
in eq.(B1) can be written as Tk = OAk ◦ OBk ◦ IAk ◦ IBk
where OAk (OBk ) consists of output operations for given
inputs x (y) and IAk (IBk ) of operations on the inputs
x (y). Moreover, the component of IAk ◦ IBk (P ) for the
inputs x and y and outputs a and b can be expressed as
PAz(x,k),Bt(y,k)(a, b) with z(x, k) and t(y, k) determined by
IAk and IBk , respectively.
Let Pˆ be any distribution tuple with alphabets A and
B and Cx and Dy random variables such that PCx,Dy =
Pˆx,y. An output relabeling for some given x acts on Pˆ as
follows. The components Pˆx,y(a, b) are replaced by the
probabilities Pˆx,y(pi(a), b) = Ppi−1(Cx),Dy (a, b) where pi is
a permutation on A and pi−1 is its inverse and the other
ones remain unchanged, and similarly for a given input y.
An output coarse graining is characterized by an input, a
subset of the corresponding output alphabet and an ele-
ment of this subset, say x, A′ and a′, respectively. Under
this operation, Pˆx,y(a, b) does not change for a /∈ A′, van-
ishes for a ∈ A′ \ {a′} and becomes ∑a′′∈A′ Pˆx,y(a′′, b)
for a = a′ and the other probabilities remain the same,
and similarly for given y, B′ ⊂ B and b′ ∈ B′. The com-
ponents for x of the resulting distribution tuple can be
written as PF (Cx),Dy (a, b) where the self-map F on A is
given by F (a) = a for a /∈ A′ and F (a) = a′ for a ∈ A′.
Consequently, the component for the inputs x and y and
outputs a and b of Tk(P ) in eq.(B1) can be expressed
as PFx,k(Az(x,k)),Gy,k(Bt(y,k))(a, b) with self-maps Fx,k and
Gy,k on A and B, respectively, determined by OAk andOBk , respectively.
The above shows that
P ′x,y = p0PA˜x,B˜y +
∑
k≥1
pkPFx,k(Az(x,k)),Gy,k(Bt(y,k)).
It remains to introduce a random non-negative integer K
with distribution PK(k) = pk and the random variables
A′x and B
′
y given in the Lemma. The probability mass
function of K, A′x and B
′
y is PKPA′x,B′y|K with
PA′x,B′y|K(a, b|k) = PA˜x,B˜y (a, b) for k = 0,
= PFx,k(Az(x,k)),Gx,k(Bt(y,k))(a, b) for k ≥ 1.
Summing over k gives the marginal distribution PA′x,B′y =
P ′x,y.
For a quantum P , the distributions of the Ax and By
can be written as
PAx,By (a, b) = tr(ρluMx,a ⊗Ny,b), (B2)
where ρlu is a density operator on HA ⊗ HB and Mx,a
(Ny,b) are positive operators such that
∑
a∈AMx,a = IA
(
∑
b∈BNy,b = IB). For any self-maps F on A and G onB, one has
PF (Ax),G(By)(a, b) =
∑
a′∈F−1({a})
b′∈G−1({b})
PAx,By (a
′, b′).
This expression can be recast into the form of eq.(B2)
with Mx,a and Ny,b replaced, respectively, by the oper-
ators MF,x,a =
∑
a′∈F−1({a})Mx,a′ and NG,y,b defined
similarly and so
PFx,k(Az(x,k)),Gy,k(Bt(y,k))(a, b)
= tr(ρluMFx,k,z(x,k),a ⊗NGy,k,t(y,k),b).
The Bell local distribution tuple L is also given by
eq.(B2) with ρlu, Mx,a and Ny,b replaced by
ρ˜′lu =
∑
k,a,b
PK(k)PA˜,B˜(a, b)Π
Alice
k,a,b ⊗ΠBobk,a,b, (B3)
∑
k,a,b δax,aΠ
Alice
k,a,b and
∑
k,a,b δby,bΠ
Bob
k,a,b, respectively,
where the ΠAlicek,a,b (Π
Bob
k,a,b) are mutually orthogonal rank-
one projectors. Finally, equation (B2) with ρlu, Mx,a and
Ny,b replaced by ρ˜
′
lu ⊗ ρlu,
M ′x,a =
∑
k,a,b
ΠAlicek,a,b⊗
[
δk,0δax,aIA+(1−δk,0)MFx,k,z(x,k),a
]
,
(B4)
and N ′y,b defined similarly, leads to P
′, which is hence
quantum.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Let P and P ′ be two quantum distribution tuples
with numbers m and n of inputs such that the former is
7not less nonlocal than the latter. For these tuples, the
Lemma gives the random variables K, A˜x and B˜y, the
self-maps Fx,k and Gy,k and the input maps z and t. At
some stage of any raw key protocol rkp, a random vari-
able U (V ) is produced according to U = Ax (V = By)
when X = x (Y = y) where the Ax (By) are the ran-
dom variables among which Alice (Bob) can choose and
X (Y ) is a random variable with alphabet in {1, . . . ,m}
({1, . . . , n}). We name rkp1 the part of rkp before the
generation of U and V and rkp2 that after it.
From any rkp, we define the protocol rkp′ as follows.
First, Alice creates K, the A˜x and B˜y and sends all of
them over the public channel. Then, Alice and Bob exe-
cute rkp1 and, instead of producing U and V as explained
above, they proceed as follows. Alice generates, in se-
quence, X ′ which is X if K = 0 and z(X, k) if K = k ≥ 1,
U ′ according to U ′ = Ax′ when X ′ = x′ and U which is
A˜x if (K,X) = (0, x) and Fx,k(U
′) if (K,X) = (k, x) with
k ≥ 1. Similarly, Bob generates Y ′ which is Y if K = 0
and t(Y, k) if K = k ≥ 1, V ′ according to V ′ = By′
when Y ′ = y′ and V which is B˜y if (K,Y ) = (0, y) and
Gy,k(V
′) if (K,Y ) = (k, y) with k ≥ 1. Finally, Alice
and Bob discard X ′, U ′, Y ′, V ′, K, the A˜x and the B˜y
which do not play any role in rkp2 and complete rkp2.
One has S ≤ R(P ) where S is defined similarly as R(P )
but taking the supremum only over the raw key protocols
of the particular form just described.
Consider any such protocol rkp′, initial tripartite state
ρ and measurement operators Mx,a and Ny,b on HA and
HB , respectively, and assume that Alice and Bob perform
rkp′. After the creation and transmission of K, the A˜x
and the B˜y and the execution of rkp1, Alice, Bob and
Eve share the state ρ˜′ ⊗ ρ˜⊗ ρ where ρ˜ is given by eq.(2)
with the distribution PX,Y ,E of rkp1 and
ρ˜′ =
∑
k,a,b
PK(k)PA˜,B˜(a, b)Π
Alice
k,a,b⊗ΠBobk,a,b⊗ΠEvek,a,b, (C1)
with the same notations as in eq.(B3). The sum of the
projectors ΠAlicek,a,b (Π
Bob
k,a,b, Π
Eve
k,a,b) is the identity operator
on a Hilbert space H′′A (H′′B , H′′E). Alice and Bob then
generate U and V according to rkp′ and discard X ′, U ′,
Y ′, V ′, K, the A˜x and the B˜y, which leads to
ω =
∑
a,b,x,y
PA˜,B˜(a, b)Ox,y⊗
[
p0Π
U,V
ax,by
⊗ΠEve0,a,b⊗ trH ρ
+
∑
k≥1,u′,v′
pkΠ
U,V
Fx,k(u′),Gy,k(v′)
⊗ΠEvek,a,b
⊗ trH(ρMz(x,k),u′ ⊗Nt(y,k),v′ ⊗ IE)
]
,
where x and y correspond to X and Y , respectively, ΠU,Vu,v
denotes mutually orthogonal rank-one projectors and the
notations Ox,y =
∑
e PX,Y ,E(x,y, e)Π
Alice
x,e ⊗ ΠBoby,e ⊗
ΠEvee , pk = PK(k) and H = HA ⊗ HB are used. The
state ω can be rewritten as
ω =
∑
x,y,u,v
Ox,y⊗ΠU,Vu,v ⊗trH′((ρ˜′⊗ρ)(M ′x,u⊗N ′y,v⊗I ′′E)),
(C2)
where M ′x,u is given by eq.(B4), N
′
y,v by a similar ex-
pression, I ′′E is the identity operator on HE ⊗ H′′E and
H′ = HA ⊗H′′A ⊗HB ⊗H′′B .
As soon as tr(ρMx,a⊗Ny,b⊗IE) = Px,y(a, b), the state
ρ˜′⊗ρ, the operators M ′x,a and N ′y,b given by eq.(B4) and
the distributions P ′x,y are related in the same way, see the
proof of the Lemma. Thus, one has R(P ′) ≤ S′ where S′
is defined similarly as R(P ′) but taking the infimum only
over such particular states and measurement operators.
When the state initially shared by the three parties is ρ˜′⊗
ρ and Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are characterized
by the operators M ′x,a and N
′
y,b, respectively, performing
rkp1 and generating U and V according to rkp gives the
state (C2), see the derivation of equation (3). So, in
this case, the tripartite state obtained at the end of rkp
is identical to that resulting from the execution of the
protocol rkp′ with ρ, Mx,a and Ny,b. Consequently, S
and S′ are equal to each other, which finishes the proof
of property (i).
(ii) Any Bell local distribution tuple can be written
in quantum form with the state given by eq.(C1) with-
out K and measurement operators
∑
a,b δax,aΠ
Alice
a,b and∑
a,b δby,bΠ
Bob
a,b , see the proof of the Lemma. Performing
any raw key protocol with this initial state and Alice’s
and Bob’s measurements described by these operators
leads to the state
ρrk =
∑
a,b,x,y,
e,a,b
PA|U,X,E(a|ax,x, e)PB|V,Y ,E(b|by,y, e)
× PX,Y ,E(x,y, e)PA˜,B˜(a, b)Πa ⊗Πb ⊗Πe,a,b,
where x (y) corresponds to X (Y ) and Πe,a,b = Π
Eve
e ⊗
ΠEvea,b . Assume that Eve simply makes the measure-
ment of operators Πe,a,b on ρrk. The three parties are
left with classical random variables. Since PX,Y ,E =
PX|EPY |EPE , the probability mass function of A, B
and the random variables available to Eve, i.e., A˜, B˜
and E, is PA|A˜,EPB|B˜,EPA˜,B˜PE and hence A and B are
conditionally independent given Eve’s variables. Conse-
quently, Alice and Bob cannot generate a secret key [28].
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 2
For any P ∈ Q, we define the family of distribution
tuples P p = pP + (1 − p)L where L is any Bell local
distribution tuple and p varies from 0 to 1. They belong
to Q since L ⊂ Q and Q is convex [25]. Clearly, P p
is continuous with respect to p, P 1 = P and P 0 = L.
Moreover, P is not less nonlocal than P p for any p ∈ [0, 1]
[27]. We denote by Qs the set of all P ∈ Q such that
N(P ) = s and define the function f , on the set I of the
8values of N , by f(s) = infP∈QsM(P ). By construction,
f ◦ N ≤ M on Q and there is, for any s ∈ I, P ∈ Qs
such that M(P ) and f(s) are as close to each other as
we wish. Since M and N vanish on L, there is a set Q0
containing L and f(0) = 0.
The set Q is closed and bounded [25] and so, due to the
extreme value theorem, the continuous function N has a
maximum on Q. It is nonnegative since N is. We name
it as Nm. Consider Pˆ ∈ Q such that N(Pˆ ) = Nm, and
define Pˆ p as described above. Owing to the continuity
properties of N and Pˆ p, N(Pˆ p) is a continuous function
of p. It is equal to 0 for p = 0 and to Nm for p = 1.
Thus, due to the intermediate value theorem, for any s ∈
[0, Nm], there is q such that N(Pˆ q) = s. Consequently,
I is equal to this interval.
For any P ∈ Qs, N(P p) is a continuous function of
p which is equal to 0 for p = 0 and to s for p = 1.
So, for any s′ ∈ [0, s], there is q such that P q ∈ Qs′ .
Moreover, since P is not less nonlocal than P q and M
is a nonlocality monotone, one has M(P ) ≥ M(P q) ≥
f(s′). Thus, for any s and s′ in I such that s′ ≤ s, f(s′)
is a lower bound of M on Qs, which implies that f is
nondecreasing.
Appendix E: Upper bound on the threshold N˜∗
The largest rate R′(ρrk) at which Alice and Bob can
establish a common private key when they share a large
number of copies of the state ρrk, given by eq.(3), with
Eve obeys
R′(ρrk) ≥ I(A : B) +
∑
a
PA(a)S(ωa)− S(ω),
where I(A : B) is the mutual information between A and
B, S denotes the von Neumann entropy, ω = trHAB ρ
′
and ωa = trHAB (ρ
′Ma ⊗ I ′B ⊗ I ′E)/PA(a) with I ′B the
identity operator on HB⊗H′B [8]. We consider m = n =
2, random variables Ax and By with values in {−1, 1} and
a raw key protocol in which Alice creates three equally
distributed random variables, X, Y and Z and sends Y
and Z over the public channel, A = ν(X,Y )ZU where
ν is a map from {1, 2}2 to {−1, 1} such that ν(x, y) =
−1 for only one pair (x, y) and B = ZV . The values
of Z are −1 and 1, X and Y are the choice random
variables for Alice and Bob, respectively, with alphabet
{1, 2}. Consequently, PA = PB = 1/2 and the above
Eve’s states are given by ω =
∑
y,z Πy,z ⊗ trHA⊗HB ρ/4
and
ωa =
∑
x,y,z
Πy,z ⊗ trHA⊗HB (ρMx,zν(x,y)a ⊗ IB ⊗ IE)/4,
omitting the superscript for the projectors.
Since m = n = 2 and A = B = {−1, 1}, these states
can be rewritten as ω =
∑
y,z,λ pλΠy,z ⊗ trH2 ρλ/4 and
ωa =
∑
x,y,z,λ
pλ
8
Πy,z ⊗ trH2(ρλ(I + zνaΣAx,λ)⊗ I ⊗ IE),
omitting the arguments of ν, where pλ denotes probabil-
ities summing to unity, H the Hilbert space of dimension
2, ρλ density operators on H2 ⊗HE , and I the identity
operator on H. In some basis of H, depending on λ, the
diagonal elements of the operators ΣAx,λ can be expressed
as ± cos θx,λ and the nondiagonal ones as sin θx,λ [9]. In
terms of the states ρλ, the distributions Px,y read as
Px,y(a, b) =
∑
λ
pλ
4
tr(ρλ(I + aΣ
A
x,λ)⊗ (I + bΣBy,λ)⊗ IE),
where the operators ΣBy,λ are similar to the Σ
A
x,λ.
The above Eve’s states can be further simplified into
ω =
∑
λ pλ trH2 ρ
′
λ and
ωa =
∑
x,λ
pλ
2
trH2(ρ′λ(I + aΣ
A
x,λ)⊗ I ⊗ I ′E).
The states ρ′λ are given by ρ
′
λ =
∑
y,z Πy,z⊗ρλ,zν/4 where
ρλ,1 = ρλ and ρλ,−1 = σAλ ⊗σBλ ⊗IEρλσAλ ⊗σBλ ⊗IE with
σAλ = (
0−i
i 0) in the basis in which the Σ
A
x,λ are real and
similarly for σBλ . The above expression for ωa results
from σAλ Σ
A
x,λσ
A
λ = −ΣAx,λ. The reduced density operator
on H2 of ρ′λ is trHE (ρλ,1 + ρλ,−1)/2 which can always be
taken to be a Bell diagonal state and hence
S(ωλ)−
∑
a
S(ωλ,x,a)/2 ≤ h([1 + (Nλ +N2λ/4)1/2]/2),
where ωλ = trH2 ρ′λ, ωλ,x,a = trH2(ρ
′
λ(I+aΣ
A
x,λ)⊗I⊗I ′E),
h is the binary entropy function and Nλ is the max-
imum violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt in-
equality [29] for the state trHE (ρλ,1 + ρλ,−1)/2 [9]. As∑
a,b abPx,y(a, b) =
∑
a,b abPx,y(−a,−b), the value of
〈AxBy〉 remains the same when ρλ is replaced by (ρλ,1 +
ρλ,−1)/2 and so N˜(P) ≤
∑
λ pλNλ where N˜ is defined by
eq.(7). Thus, due to the properties of the Holevo quan-
tity and of h, the above inequality is valid with ωλ, ωλ,x,a
and Nλ replaced, respectively, by ω, ωa and N˜(P).
Since PA = PB = 1/2, one has I(A : B) = 1− h(1/2 +
|〈AB〉|/2) where
〈AB〉 = 〈ν(X,Y )UV 〉 = 1
4
∑
x,y
ν(x, y)〈AxBy〉,
and thus maxν I(A : B) ≥ 1 − h(3/4 + N˜(P)/8). The
above results show that R ≥ g′ ◦ N˜ where g′ is given by
g′(z) = 1− h
(
3
4
+
z
8
)
− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
z +
z2
4
)
.
As R is nonnegative, the right side of the above inequality
can be replaced by zero when it is negative and hence
R ≥ g ◦ N˜ with g(z) = max{0, g′(z)}. The value g′(z) is
positive for z ≥ 0.652. So, the nonlocality monotone N˜
has a threshold value N˜∗ ≤ 0.652.
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